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ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE 1993 AMENDMENTS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY IMMUNIZED 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE VEHICLES FROM TORT LIABILITY WHEN 
RESPONDING TO AN ORDINARY AUTO ACCIDENT 
A. "Open Courts" Provision - Utah Constitution, Art. I, Section 11: 
JL Berry Analysis 
Despite the recent changes in the composition of this Court, the analysis of Berry v. Beech 
Aircraft, 111 P.2d 670, 675 (Utah 1985) analysis was re-affirmed in Tindley v. Salt Lake City Sch. 
Dist. ,116 P.3d 295; 2005 UT 30. There, the School District failed to carry the "substantial burden" 
of convincing the Court that "the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of 
changing conditions and that more good than harm will come by departing from precedent", 
Tindlley, ^[15, quoting Laney v. Fairview City, 2002 UT 79 at ^ |45,57 P.3d 1007. The proper analysis 
is under Berry, Wasatch County has failed to carry its burden under Berry to set forth why stare 
decisis should not be followed. 
2. Clegg Had A Remedy Against Jensen, Individually 
The first step of the Berry analysis is to determine whether Clegg was denied a remedy that 
he had when the governmental immunity statute was passed. Wasatch County claims "[tjhere is no 
basis for an argument that Clegg has been denied a remedy". (Appellee's Brief, p. 27). However, 
Wasatch County identifies no remedy that Clegg has for his injuries. The fact that Clegg was turned 
1 
out of court without so much as a trial on immunity grounds seems like the ultimate lack of remedy. 
The next question is whether Clegg had a "right" to a remedy against Jensen.] Prior decisions 
of this Court show that Clegg had a remedy against Jensen prior to the passage of the statutory 
governmental immunity provisions, beginning in 1965. Day v. State recognized a statutory duty of 
care toward other drivers on the part of emergency vehicle operators while engaging in high speed 
pursuit. This statutory duty is traced from 1931, through the 1993 amendments. Day, fn. 4. Day held 
that this statute "clearly established a duty of reasonable care on the part of operators of emergency 
vehicles to those sharing the use of a road with emergency vehicles". Id. In accordance with this 
generalized statement of the duty created, there is no reason why that duty would not apply to high 
speed emergency response as opposed to high speed pursuit. The duty to drive with reasonable care 
applies whether an emergency responder is driving in pursuit of a criminal or to the scene of an 
automobile accident. 
This duty was again recognized in Lyon v. Burton, 5 P.3d 616; 2000 UT 19. While Day 
specifically imposed a duty of reasonable care on drivers of emergency vehicles in "pursuit", Lyon 
found the same duty of reasonable care on drivers of emergency vehicles in "response". Day 
involved a police pursuit of a fleeing criminal, while Lyon involved a fire chief driving to an 
emergency fire. Both cases essentially state the same holding, in the two kinds of emergency vehicle 
liability: pursuit and response. 
1
 Wasatch County falls within the Standifordtest for governmental functions. See Lyon v. 
Burton, at f 14, holding that driving an emergency vehicle to the scene of a fire is a 
"governmental function". 
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Lyon extensively examined the historical roots of liability for government employees in their 
individual capacity. Lyon found that historically, a person driving an emergency vehicle would be 
acting in a "ministerial" or "operational" capacity. Id., at 629-630; ^[45-49. 
Under these long-established principles, Chief Burton would be personally liable to 
plaintiffs for his negligent driving. Jensen, 2 Utah 2d 196,271 P.2d 838, is squarely 
on point. Jensen suggests that the operation of an emergency vehicle such as a fire 
engine does not involve the exercise of governmental discretion. On facts much like 
the instant case, Jensen held the driver of a city fire engine personally liable for 
negligently causing injuries to a passenger in a car hit by the fire engine, even though 
the city was immune from suit. Cornwall, 571 P.2d 925, held to the same effect with 
respect to a deputy sheriffs negligent driving while responding to an emergency 
situation.[citations omitted]. 
Id. At f48. 
Wasatch County has failed to explain why Jensen would be acting in a "ministerial" or 
"operational" capacity while responding to a fire, as in Lyon, but not to an automobile accident. No 
logical distinction seems apparent. The trial court erred in failing to recognize that Jensen would 
have been personally liable for negligent driving at common law, before the Governmental Immunity 
Act was passed in 1965 and 1987. 
X Clegg Has No Substitute Remedy Against Wasatch County. 
Wasatch County argues that the 1993 Legislative amendments removed any duty Jensen 
might have previously owed to Clegg. The next question is whether Clegg was provided a substitute 
remedy. Three members of this Court agreed in Lyon that the substituted cause of action against the 
Fire District, while capped at $250,000.00, was an adequate substitute remedy. Lyon, at 638, f82-83, 
". . . the substitution of remedies is effective and reasonable" (J. Howe, J. Russon concurring, J. 
Zimmerman concurring in the result). While Justice Zimmerman did not join at all in the Berry 
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analysis in Lyon, Justice Howe correctly pointed out that the right to sue the governmental entity up 
to the "cap" on damages, as a substitute for suit against a negligent employee, was upheld against 
a similar attack in Payne v. Myers, 743 P.2d 186 (Utah 1987). See also Parks v. U. T.A., 53 P.3d 473; 
2002 UT 55, TJ20 (declining to review Lyon). 
Clegg is not in the same position as Lyon; he has no substitute remedy, capped or otherwise. 
In that way, he is like Day, who had no remedy at all. 
4. There is No Clear Social or Economic Evil to Justify Absolute Immunity. 
While this is not the only way to read the 1993 amendments, see infra, if, in fact, the 
Legislature intended to immunize emergency "responders" as well as "pursuers", it left no trace in 
the legislative history. The Legislative history of the 1993 amendments focused only on the specific 
problem in Day, which was emergency pursuit of criminals. The Legislature attempted to respond 
to Day, by identifying criminals fleeing the police as a "very, very serious problem", justifying 
immunity for high-speed pursuit when following written policies for such pursuits. (Appellee's Brief, 
p. 26, 28). However, Clegg was not fleeing the police, and Jensen was responding to an ordinary 
automobile accident. There is no legislative history that would justify abrogating Clegg's remedies. 
A careful reading of the 1993 amendments reveals that there was a quid pro quo involving high-
speed pursuit cases: immunity was granted to pursuers, but only upon following written pursuit 
policies. The emergency pursuers got something, and the other drivers on public roads got 
something, in the form of the assurance that emergency pursuers would be acting pursuant to a 
considered, written policy, providing some balancing of the risks to the public, rather than a "car-
chase" mentality. There is no similar quid pro quo relating to emergency responders. 
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Wasatch County suggests no "clear social or economic evil" that must be addressed by 
allowing emergency responders the freedom to drive in a reckless manner to an ordinary auto 
accident scene. Wasatch County does not indicate how granting Jensen immunity "would promote 
public safety or defeat essential or core governmental activities and programs that are critical to the 
protection of public safety and welfare". Lyon v. Burton, 5 P.3d 616, 620 n. 5 (Utah 2000). As in 
Lyon, "Defendants assert no factual or policy justification for the abrogation of remedies against 
government employees other than the saving of money". Lyon, at 632, f 56. 
Given that the Utah Supreme Court already held complete immunity to violate Article I, 
Section 11 of the Utah Constitution in Day v. State, 980 P.2d 1171; 1999 UT 46, the burden should 
be on Wasatch County to somehow justify any change in law that would completely abrogate any 
claim by Clegg against an emergency vehicle. Wasatch County offers no rationale why a complete 
denial of a remedy in 1993 is consistent with a constitutionally required remedy in 1992. Wasatch 
County has utterly failed to carry its burden to justify the abrogation of Clegg's remedies. 
B. Uniform Operation of Laws - Article I, Section 24 
The Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 24, also states that "All laws of a general nature 
shall have uniform operation". Wasatch County fails to offer any explanation why the 1993 statutory 
scheme treats two classes of victims: 1) those injured by emergency vehicles in pursuit, or while 
running red lights or stop signs; 2) those injured in any other way by the negligent operation of an 
emergency vehicle, in a uniform way. Of course, it does not. There is no uniformity whatsoever. 
Wasatch County only cites to the legislative history referencing high-speed pursuits of fleeing 
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criminals, a different part of U.C.A. §41-6-14 entirely.2 
Clegg belongs to a class of persons consisting of users of public roads. Jensen belongs to a 
class of persons consisting of emergency vehicle operators. The class of emergency vehicle operators 
is plausibly divided factually into two classes, pursuers and responders. But there is no apparent 
logical or legal reason why the class of emergency vehicle operators should be sub-divided into two 
classes, so that immunity should attach to responders but not to pursuers. If anything, a tenuous 
argument could be made that pursuers should have immunity, rather than responders. Fleeing 
criminals may not be apprehended if not immediately pursued. They may pose a further immediate 
threat to the public. The situation is dynamic, requiring a dynamic response. However, the scene of 
an auto accident is generally static. The skidmarks and shattered glass are not going to flee 
apprehension. While emergency medical attention may be necessary, still, allowing reckless or 
negligent driving to reach the scene of an auto accident creates a greater risk of delay due to an 
accident caused in response. The Clegg/Jensen collision is a perfect illustration; Jensen's negligent 
and reckless driving prevented him from providing assistance at the first auto accident scene, and 
necessitated diversion of emergency medical response resources to the Clegg/Jensen collision, rather 
than the original accident. 
The most plausible distinction between pursuers and responders, for immunity purposes, 
actually cuts in the other direction. If anything, there is no reason to take big risks in responding to 
2If the Court finds that Kouris, infra, requires reversal, the constitutionality of U.C.A. 
§41-6-14 (1993) need not be considered. Constitutional questions should be avoided. Lyon v. 
Burton, 2000 UT 19, If 10; 5 P.3d 616. 
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a static accident scene, while there may be situations where taking risks is justified in pursuing a 
criminal. In fact, the statutory requirement for a written pursuit policy appears to recognize and adopt 
this very distinction. But, there seems to be no rational justification for completely immunizing 
responders. 
The literal structure of Section 41-6-14 also subdivides responders into two classes: those 
proceeding past a red or stop signal or signal or sign (subsection (b)), and those who speed 
(subsection (c)), park, stop or stand (subsection (a)), or otherwise violate the Traffic Code 
regulations on direction of movement or turning in specified directions (subsection (d)). Wasatch 
County would read this statute as requiring emergency responders to proceed past a red light or stop 
sign "only after slowing down as may be necessary for safe operation", but otherwise allowing 
completely unsafe driving by such operators. There is no rationale for this distinction whatsoever. 
These two distinct classes are created arbitrarily. They resemble those struck down in Malan 
v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984)(Guest Statute). The statutory classifications suggested above do 
not operate generally or uniformly across the class, i.e., the class of other drivers, such as Clegg, or 
the class of emergency vehicle operators, such as Jensen. And they are not based upon differences 
that have a reasonable tendency to further the objectives of the statute. Id., at 670. The purpose stated 
in the legislative history of balancing the need for apprehension of criminals versus the dangers of 
high-speed pursuit is not fiirthered at all by immunizing emergency responders to an auto accident 
who drive at reckless speeds, but do not drive through red lights or stop signs. 
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POINT TWO 
THE LEGISLATURE DID NOT INTEND TO PROVIDE A BLANKET 
IMMUNITY TO ANY EMERGENCY RESPONDER WHO ACTIVATES 
LIGHTS AND SIREN 
It is not clear that the Legislature intended any change in civil tort law when it passed the 
1993 amendments to U.C.A. 41-6-14. The prior 1987 version provided a privilege to emergency 
vehicle operators to violate certain traffic laws, but made clear that these privileges did not affect 
civil tort liability: "the privileges under this section do not relieve the operator of an authorized 
emergency vehicle from the duty to operate the vehicle with due regard for the safety of all persons 
.. .".U.C.A. §41-6-14(3 )(a)( 1987). This makes sense when recalling that the Traffic Code generally 
is a criminal code, for criminal responsibility arising out of traffic. See U.C.A. §41-6-
12(1987)(violation of traffic code is a Class C misdemeanor). The Traffic Code only rarely deals 
with civil tort liability issues, and when it does, it does so specifically. See e.g. U.C.A. §41-6-
52(2)(1987)(criminal violation of posted prima facie speed limit do not relieve plaintiff in civil 
action from proving negligence and proximate causation). The immunity for emergency pursuers that 
was found unconstitutional in Day was not located in the Traffic Code at all; it was an "add-on" to 
the Governmental Immunity Act. 
What this means is that the provisions of 41 -6-14 that grant privileges to violate the criminal 
provisions of the Traffic Code do not necessarily reflect a decision on the part of the Legislature to 
alter the basic rule of tort liability. This reading is suggested by the fact that the 2004 amendment 
to 41-6-14 re-inserted the original requirement of the 1987 statute that emergency vehicle operators 
"act as a reasonably prudent emergency vehicle operator in like circumstances". U.C.A. §41-6-
8 
14(5)(2004). If one concludes that the 1993 amendments were not intended to remove the duty to 
drive reasonably and prudently, that explains the fact that there is no legislative history whatsoever 
discussing it. It explains why there is no apparent legislative history regarding the re-appearance of 
the language in 2004. 
If the duty of emergency vehicle operators to drive reasonably and prudently existed all along, 
the problem posed by Kouris v. U.H.P., 70 P.3d 72,2003 UT 19, is solved. In Kouris, a majority of 
this Court could not choke down the proposition that merely activating lights and siren granted a 
blanket immunity to drive however negligently or recklessly. The dissent could not choke down the 
proposition that 41-6-14 should not be read literally to provide for just that result. But if the 1993 
amendments are viewed in a broader historical context, taking due regard to the fact that the Traffic 
Code really only deals with criminal violations, not civil liabilities, and in light of the original 1987 
requirement of reasonableness and prudence, and the subsequent 2004 re-insertion of subsection (5) 
expressly requiring a duty of reasonable care and prudence, Kouris can be read to merely support the 
historical rule of tort liability all along. This approach avoids the necessity of addressing the 
constitutional issues raised above. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Legislature attempted to raise from the dead, blanket immunity for emergency 
response vehicles, like Lazarus of old. The statute that it created in 1993 failed the Article 1, Section 
11 test, and the Uniform Operation of Laws test of Section 24. This is made even more apparent by 
the 2004 amendments that essentially concede the issue, and bring the statute in line with Day. The 
Kouris holding requires reversal as well, adding the benefit of avoiding constitutional issues. The 
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trial court's summary judgment should be reversed. 
DATED this 20th Day of October, 2008. 
\ 
Daniel F. Bertch 
r» T M 
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ADDENDUM 
A. 1987 version of U.C.A. §41-6-14 
B. 1993 version of U.C.A. §41-6-14 
C. 2004 version of U.C.A. §41-6-14 
41-6-14 MOTOR VEHICLES 
(d) Any claimant or interested par ty shall file with the 
court a verified answer to the complaint within 20 days 
after service has been obtained. 
(e) When property is seized under this chapter, any 
interested person or claimant of the property, prior to 
being served with a complaint under this section, may file 
a petition in the court having jurisdiction for release of his 
interest in the property. The petition shall specify the 
claimant's interest in the property and his right to have it 
released. A copy shall be served upon the county attorney 
in the county of the seizure, who shall answer the petition 
within 20 days. A petitioner need not answer a complaint 
of forfeiture. 
(f) After 20 days following service of a complaint or 
petition for release, the court shall examine the record 
and if no answer is on file, the court shall allow the 
complainant or petitioner an opportunity to present evi-
dence in support of his claim and order forfeiture or 
release of the property as the court determines. If the 
county attorney has not filed an answer to a petition for 
release and the court determines from the evidence tha t 
the petitioner is not entitled to recovery of the property, it 
shall enter an order directing the county attorney to 
answer the petition within ten days. If no answer is filed 
within tha t period, the court shall order the release of the 
property to the petitioner entitled to receive it. 
(g) When an answer to a complaint or petition appears 
of record at the end of 20 days, the court shall set the 
mat ter for hearing within 20 days. At this hearing, all 
interested parties may present evidence of their rights of 
release of the property following the state's evidence for 
forfeiture. The court shall determine by a preponderance 
of the evidence the issues in the case and order forfeiture 
or release of the property as it determines. 
(h) Proceedings of this section are independent of any 
other proceedings, whether civil or criminal, under this 
chapter or the laws of this s ta te . 
(i) When the court determines t ha t claimants have no 
right in the property in whole or in part , it shall declare 
the property to be forfeited and direct it to be delivered to 
the custody of the Division of Finance. The division shall 
dispose of the property under Subsection (5). 
(j) When the court determines tha t property, in whole 
or in part, is not subject to forfeiture, it shall order release 
of the property to the proper claimant. If the court 
determines tha t the property is subject to forfeiture and 
release in part , it shall order part ia l release and part ial 
forfeiture. When the property cannot be divided for par-
tial forfeiture and release, the court shall order it sold and 
the proceeds distributed: 
(i) first, proportionally among the legitimate 
claimants; 
(ii) second, to defray the costs of the action, includ-
ing seizure, storage of the property, legal costs of 
filing and pursuing the forfeiture, and costs of sale; 
and 
(iii) third, to the Division of Finance for the Gen-
eral Fund. 
(k) In a proceeding under this section where forfeiture 
is declared, in whole or in part, the court shall assess all 
costs of the forfeiture proceeding, including seizure and 
storage of the property, against t h e individual or individu-
als whose conduct was the basis of the forfeiture, and may 
assess costs against any other c la imant or claimants to 
the property as appropriate. 
(7) For purposes of this section, i t shall be a rebuttable 
presumption tha t the owner of a vehicle was the operator of 
the vehicle at the t ime of the offense. 1996 
41-6-14. Emergency vehicles — Pol icy regarding*! 
h i d e pursuits — Applicability of traffic la* 
highway work veh ic les — Exempt ions . 
(1) The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle,
 WK 
responding to an emergency call or when m the pursuit of d 
actual or suspected violator of the law or when responding 
but not upon returning from a fire alarm, may exercise S 
privileges under this section, subject to Subsections (9ff 
through (4). Jz£ 
(2) The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle m a y i 
(a) park or stand, irrespective of the provisions oftH^ 
chapter; ^ 
(b) proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but *" 
only after slowing down as may be necessary for
 8ag/, 
operation; J& 
(c) exceed the maximum speed limits; or A 
(d) disregard regulations governing direction of movfe 
ment or turning in specified directions.
 H : 
(3) Privileges granted under this section to the operator 6W 
an authorized emergency vehicle, who is not involved in a 
vehicle pursuit, apply only when the operator of the vehicle, 
sounds an audible signal under Section 41-6-146, or usesf:> 
visual signal as defined under Section 41-6-132, which is" 
visible from in front of the vehicle. 
(4) Privileges granted under this section to the operator of 
an authorized emergency vehicle involved in any vehicle" 
pursuit apply only when: 
(a) the operator of the vehicle sounds both an audibler* 
signal under Section 41-6-146 and uses a visual signal as* 
denned under Section 41-6-132, which is visible from in 
front of the vehicle; 
(b) the public agency employing the operator of the 
vehicle has, in effect, a written policy which describes the 
manner and circumstances in which any vehicle pursuit 
should be conducted and terminated; 
(c) the operator of the vehicle has been trained in 
accordance with the written policy described in Subsec-
tion (4)(b); and 
(d) the pursuit policy of the public agency is in conform-
ance with standards established by the Department of 
Public Safety, Division of Peace Officer Standards and 
Training, which shall adopt minimum standards that 
shall be incorporated into all emergency pursuit policies 
adopted by public agencies authorized to operate emer-
gency pursuit vehicles. 
(5) Except for Sections 41-6-13.5, 41-6-44, and 41-6-45, this 
chapter does not apply to persons, motor vehicles, and other 
equipment while actually engaged in work upon the surface of 
a highway. However, the entire chapter applies to those 
persons and vehicles when traveling to or from the work. 
1993 
41-6-15. Persons riding or driving animals subject to 
chapter. 
A person riding an animal or driving any animal-drawn 
vehicle upon a roadway is subject to this chapter, except the 
penalties regarding operator licenses specified under the alco-
hol or drug related traffic offenses do not apply. 198 
41-6-16. Uniform application of chapter - Effect of 
local ordinances. 
The provisions of this chapter are applicable and iirdform 
throughout this state and in all of its political subdivisions 
and municipalities. A local authority may not enact or enforce 
any rule or ordinance in conflict with the provisions 01 tw 
chapter. Local authorities may, however, adopt ordinance 
consistent with this chapter, and additional traffic ordinan0® 
which are not in conflict with this chapter. l 
41-6-1.5 MOTOR VEHICLES no 
(49) "Trailer" means every vehicle with or 
without motive power, other than a po\e trarier, 
designed for carrying persons or property and for 
being drawn by a motor vehicle and constructed 
so that no part of its weight rests upon the tow-
ing vehicle 
(50) "Truck" means every motor vehicle de-
signed, used, or maintained primarily for the 
transportation of property 
(51) "Truck tractor" means a motor vehicle de-
signed and used primarily for drawing other ve-
hicles and constructed to carry a part of the 
weight of the vehicle and load drawn by the truck 
tractor 
(52) "Urban district" means the territory con 
tiguous to and including any street, in which 
structures devoted to business, industry, or 
dwelling houses are situated at intervals of less 
than 100 feet, for a distance of a quarter of a mile 
or more 
(53) "Vehicle" means every device in, upon, or 
by which any person or property is or may be 
transported or drawn upon a highway, except de-
vices used exclusively upon stationary rails or 
tracks 1987 
41-6-1.5. Private vehicle as emergency vehicle 
The commissioner of the Department of Public 
Safety may make rules, consistent with this chapter, 
governing the use, m emergencies, of signal lights on 
privately-owned vehicles The rules may include a 
rule allowing privately-owned vehicles to be desig-
nated for part-time emergency use 1987 
41-6-2 to 41-6-10. Repealed. 1979 
ARTICLE 2 
EFFECT OF AND OBEDIENCE TO TRAFFIC 
REGULATIONS 
41-6-11. Chapter relates to vehicles on high-
ways — Exceptions. 
The provisions of this chapter relating to the opera-
tion of vehicles refer exclusively to the operation of 
vehicles upon highways, except 
(1) where a different place is specifically re-
ferred to in a given section, or 
(2) under the provisions of Section 41-6-13 5 
and Sections 41-6-29 to 41-6-45 inclusive, which 
apply upon highways and elsewhere throughout 
the state 1987 
41-6-12. Violations of chapter — Penalties. 
(1) A violation of any provision of this chapter is a 
class C misdemeanor, unless otherwise provided 
(2) A violation of any provision of Articles 2, 11, 
15, 16, and 17 of this chapter is an infraction, unless 
otherwise provided 1991 
41-6-13. Obedience to peace officer or other 
traffic controllers. 
(1) A person may not willfully fail or refuse to com-
ply with any lawful order or direction of any peace 
officer, fireman, flagger at a highway construction or 
maintenance site, or uniformed adult school crossing 
guard invested by law with authority to direct, con-
trol, or regulate traffic 
(2) When flaggers at highway construction or 
maintenance sites are directing traffic they shall use 
devices and procedures conforming to the latest edi-
tion of the "Manual on Uniform Traffic Control n 
vices fox Streets and Higrrways " e" 
1»87 
41-6'13.5. Failure to respond to officer's sign 
to stop — Fleeing — Traveling at exce 
sive speeds or causing property da^. 
age or bodily injury — Penalties. 
(1) An operator who, having received a visual o 
audible signal from a peace officer to bring his vehicl 
to a stop, operates his vehicle in willful or wanton 
disregard of the signal so as to interfere with or en-
danger the operation of any vehicle or person, or who 
attempts to flee or elude a peace officer by vehicle or 
other means is guilty of a class A misdemeanor 
(2) An operator who violates Subsection (1)
 an (j 
while so doing (a) travels in excess of 30 miles per 
hour above the posted speed limit, (b) causes damage 
to the property of another or bodily injury to another 
or (c) leaves the state, is guilty of a felony of the third 
degree i987 
41-6-14. Emergency vehicles — Applicability of 
traffic law to highway work vehicles — 
Exemptions. 
(1) The operator of an authorized emergency vehi-
cle, when responding to an emergency call or when m 
the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the 
law or when responding to but not upon returning 
from a fire alarm, may exercise the privileges under 
this section, subject to Subsection (2) 
(2) The operator of an authorized emergency vehi-
cle may 
(a) park or stand, irrespective of the provisions 
of this chapter, 
(b) proceed past a red or stop signal or stop 
sign, but only after slowing down as may be nec-
essary for safe operation, 
(c) exceed the maximum speed limits if the op-
erator does not endanger life or property, or 
(d) disregard regulations governing direction 
of movement or turning in specified directions 
(3) Privileges granted under this section to an au-
thorized emergency vehicle apply only when the vehi-
cle sounds an audible signal under Section 41-6-146, 
or u$es a visual signal as defined under Section 
41-6-132, which is visible from in front of the vehicle 
(a) The privileges under this section do not re-
lieve the operator of an authorized emergency 
vehicle from the duty to operate the vehicle with 
regard for the safety of all persons, or protect the 
operator from the consequences of an arbitrary 
exercise of the privileges 
(b) Except for Sections 41-6-13 5, 41-6-44, and 
41-6-45, this chapter does not apply to persons, 
motor vehicles, and other equipment while actu-
ally engaged in work upon the surface of a high-
way However, the entire chapter applies to those 
persons and vehicles when traveling to or from 
the work 1987 
41-6-15. Persons riding or driving animals sub-
ject to chapter. 
A person riding an animal or driving any animal-
drawn vehicle upon a roadway is subject to this chap-
ter, except the penalties regarding operator licenses 
specified under the alcohol or drug related traffic of-
fenses do not apply 1987 
41-6-16. Uniform application of chapter — Ef-
fect of local ordinances. 
The provisions of this chapter are applicable and 
uniform throughout this state and in all of its politi-
cal subdivisions and municipalities A local authority 
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(n) attempt to flee or elude a peace officer by 
vehicle or other means 
(b) A person who violates Subsection (l)(a) is guilty of a 
felony of the third degree The court shall, as part of any 
sentence under this Subsection (1), impose a fine of not 
less than $1,000 
(2) (a) An operator who violates Subsection (1) and while so 
doing causes death or serious bodily injury to another 
person, under circumstances not amounting to murder or 
aggravated murder, is guilty of a felony of the second 
degree 
(b) The court shall, as part of any sentence under this 
Subsection (2), impose a fine of not less than $5,000 
(3) (a) In addition to the penalty provided under this sec-
tion or any other section, a person who violates Subsec-
tion (l)(a) or (2)(a) shall have the person's driver license 
revoked under Subsection 53-3-220(l)(a)(rx) for a period of 
one year 
(b) The court shall forward the report of the conviction 
to the division If the person is the holder of a driver 
license from another jurisdiction, the court shall notify 
the division and the division shall notify the appropriate 
officials in the licensing state 2003 
41-6-13.7. Vehicle subject to forfeiture — Seizure — 
Procedure. 
(1) Any conveyance, including vehicles, aircraft, water 
craft, or other vessel used m violation of Section 41-6-13 5 
shall be subject to forfeiture pursuant to the procedures and 
substantive protections established in Title 24, Chapter 1, 
Utah Uniform Forfeiture Procedures Act 
(2) Property subject to forfeiture under this section may be 
seized by any peace officer of this state upon notice and service 
of process issued by any court having jurisdiction over the 
property However, seizure without notice and service of 
process may be made when 
(a) the seizure is incident to an arrest under a search 
warrant or an inspection under an administrative inspec-
tion warrant, 
(b) the property subject to seizure has been the subject 
of a prior judgment in favor of the state in a criminal 
injunction or forfeiture proceeding under this section, or 
(c) the peace officer has probable cause to believe that 
the property has been used m violation of the provisions of 
Section 41-6-13 5 
(3) Property taken or detained under this section is not 
repleviable but is m custody of the law enforcement agency 
making the seizure, subject only to the orders and decrees of 
the court or the official having jurisdiction When property is 
seized under this section, the appropriate person or agency 
may 
(a) place the property under seal, 
(b) remove the property to a place designated by the 
warrant under which it was seized, or 
(c) take custody of the property and remove it to an 
appropriate location for disposition in accordance with 
l aw 2002 
41-6-14. Emergency vehicles — Pol icy regarding vehi-
cle pursuits — Applicabil ity of traffic law to 
h ighway work vehic les — Exemptions . 
(1) Subject to Subsections (2) through (5), the operator of an 
authorized emergency vehicle may exercise the privileges 
granted under this section when 
(a) responding to an emergency call, 
(b) in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of 
the law, or 
(c) responding to but not upon returning from a fire 
alarm 
(2) The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle may 
(a) park or stand, irrespective of the provisions of this 
chapter, 
(b) proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but 
only after slowing down as may be necessary for safe 
operation, 
(c) exceed the maximum bpeed limits, or 
(d) disregard regulations governing direction of move-
ment or turning in specified directions 
(3) Privileges granted under this section to the operator of 
an authorized emergency vehicle, who is not involved in a 
vehicle pursuit, apply only when 
(a) the operator of the vehicle sounds an audible signal 
under Section 41-6-146, or 
(b) uses a visual signal as defined under Section 41-6-
132, which is visible from in front of the vehicle 
(4) Privileges granted under this section to the operator of 
an authorized emergency vehicle involved m any vehicle 
pursuit apply only when 
(a) the operator of the vehicle 
(I) sounds an audible signal under Section 41-6-
146, and 
(n) uses a visual signal as defined under Section 
41-6-132, which is visible from in front of the vehicle, 
(b) the public agency employing the operator of the 
vehicle has, in effect, a written policy which describes the 
manner and circumstances m which any vehicle pursuit 
should be conducted and terminated, 
(c) the operator of the vehicle has been trained m 
accordance with the written policy described in Subsec-
tion (4)(b), and 
(d) the pursuit policy of the public agency is in confor-
mance with standards established by the Department of 
Public Safety, Division of Peace Officer Standards and 
Training, which shall adopt minimum standards that 
shall be incorporated into all emergency pursuit policies 
adopted by public agencies authorized to operate emer-
gency pursuit vehicles 
(5) The privileges granted under this section do not relieve 
the operator of an authorized emergency vehicle of the duty to 
act as a reasonably prudent emergency vehicle operator m like 
circumstances 
(6) Except for Sections 41-6-13 5, 41-6-44, and 41-6-45, this 
chapter does not apply to persons, motor vehicles, and other 
equipment while actually engaged in work upon the surface of 
a highway However, the entire chapter applies to those 
persons and vehicles when traveling to or from the work 
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41-6-15. Persons riding or driving animals subject to 
chapter, 
A person ridmg an animal or driving any animal-drawn 
vehicle upon a roadway is subject to this chapter, except the 
penalties regarding operator licenses specified under the alco 
hoi or drug related traffic offenses do not apply 1987 
41-6-16. Uniform application of chapter — Effect of 
local ordinances. 
The provisions of this chapter are applicable and uniform 
throughout this state and in all of its political subdivisions 
and municipalities A local authority may not enact or enforce 
any rule or ordinance in conflict with the provisions of this 
chapter Local authorities may, however, adopt ordinances 
consistent with this chapter, and additional traffic ordinances 
which are not in conflict with this chapter 1987 
41-6-17. Regulatory powers of local authori t ies — Traf-
fic-control device affecting state h ighway — 
Necess i ty of erect ing traffic-control devices . 
(1) The provisions of this chapter do not prevent local 
authorities, with respect to highways under their jurisdiction 
and within the reasonable exercise of police power, from 
